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Juries are supposed to render verdicts that are internally consistent. At times they do not. The law is clear that a defendant cannot set aside a 
conviction on the grounds that a verdict is incon-
sistent. (Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 
(1932) (“Consistency in the verdict is not neces-
sary.”).) But what if  a trial judge explicitly instructs 
a jury that its verdict need not be consistent? The 
answer is provided in United States v. Moran-Toala, 
726 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2013).
The Facts
The case began in 2005 when Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE) agents began investigating 
a Delta Airlines baggage handler’s involvement with 
narcotics at New York’s John F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport (JFK Airport). ICE agents obtained 
judicial authorization to wiretap Jorge Espinal’s 
phone and discovered that the baggage handler was 
working with Henry Polanco, a narcotics distributor 
based in New York. Espinal told Polanco that, as 
a luggage-ramp supervisor at the airport, he could 
intercept packages containing narcotics on Delta 
planes and prevent them from being screened by 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents. For 
his part, Polanco arranged for a Dominican Repub-
lic supplier to hide packages containing cocaine, 
heroin, and ecstasy on many Delta flights; six pack-
ages were eventually seized by CBP agents.
The drug smuggling was not without incident. On 
February 11, 2006, CBP agents seized a backpack 
with cocaine and heroin from a Delta flight from 
the Dominican Republic to New York. Not realizing 
that CBP agents had the backpack, Espinal informed 
Polanco that the backpack had ended up on the inter-
national baggage carousel and then was taken to 
unclaimed baggage. The Dominican supplier, mean-
while, suspected that Espinal and Polanco had stolen 
the drugs and demanded either the return of the drugs 
or payment for the loss. When Espinal learned that the 
backpack had been seized, he informed the Dominican 
supplier that his girlfriend worked for the government 
and had access to confidential information that would 
prove that the seizure actually occurred.
The girlfriend—Elizabeth Moran-Toala—worked 
as a CBP officer from 2003 to 2007 at Hollywood 
International Airport in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. 
Her job required her to review flight manifests to 
identify airline passengers who were suspected of 
criminal activity. In that role, Moran-Toala had 
access to the Treasury Enforcement Communica-
tions System (TECS) database for work-related use. 
She was prohibited from browsing for personal or 
other non-work-related reasons. Three days after 
the backpack was seized in New York, she used the 
TECS database to access the seizure report.
In another incident, agents learned from the wire-
tap that Espinal and Polanco had arranged for a drug 
mule, Henry Cabrera, to carry a suitcase containing 
narcotics on an August 24, 2007, Delta flight from 
the Dominican Republic to JFK Airport. While wait-
ing for Cabrera’s plane to land so they could arrest 
him, agents saw Espinal attempt to enter a sterile area 
where they suspected he planned to collect the suitcase 
before Cabrera went through customs. However, those 
plans were foiled when Espinal was scared off by the 
heavy law enforcement presence. Espinal informed 
Polanco that he was unable to meet Cabrera and did 
not know what happened to the suitcase. This time it 
was Polanco who suspected that Espinal had stolen 
the drugs. Once again, Espinal said that he would con-
tact his girlfriend to provide confirmation that police 
had, indeed, intervened. Five days later, Moran-Toala 
used the TECS database to access a record of Cabre-
ra’s arrest. Telephone records revealed that she called 
Espinal’s airport work station the next day.
Three days after she accessed the TECS database to 
check on Cabrera, Moran-Toala used the database to 
determine whether another associate of Espinal’s, Vic-
tor Perez, had any outstanding warrants. The search 
revealed none, and telephone records showed two 
outgoing calls from Moran-Toala’s phone to Espinal.
The government charged Moran-Toala in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York with conspiracy to import more 
than one kilogram of heroin and more than five kilo-
grams of cocaine (count one), and with conspiracy to 
use a government computer unlawfully (count two).
While awaiting trial on the New York charges, 
Moran-Toala pleaded guilty in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida to involvement in a separate heroin 
importation and distribution conspiracy. That con-
spiracy included her sister and brother-in-law, who 
were officers of the CBP and Transportation Secu-
rity Administration. Moran-Toala admitted that 
she used the TECS system to run travel checks for 
drug couriers flying out of Fort Lauderdale and to 
access a seizure report to prove to a supplier that a 
shipment was seized, not stolen.
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The New York Trial Instructions
In the New York case, Moran-Toala admitted to 
misusing her CBP computer, but claimed that she 
had no knowledge of the drug activity on the part of 
Espinal and Polanco. The trial judge in New York, 
after initially hesitating, decided to admit the signed, 
written plea allocution in the Florida case pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The judge gave 
the following instruction to the jury:
If  you determine, in respect to count two, that 
the defendant is guilty of that count, you must 
determine whether the government has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the offense 
in [18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B)(ii)] was commit-
ted in furtherance of a criminal act in violation 
of  the Constitution and laws of  the United 
States; namely, the conspiracy to import nar-
cotics as charged in count one. It’s linked to 
count one if  you find she is guilty.
The phrase in furtherance means with the 
intent to help, advance, move forward, pro-
mote or facilitate. The government must 
therefore show that the defendant engaged 
in the conduct of accessing the United States 
Department of Homeland Security computer 
in excess of authorization, with the intent to 
advance, move forward, promote or facilitate 
the conspiracy charged in count [one] about 
which I’ve already instructed you.
(Moran-Toala, 726 F.3d at 339–40 (first alteration 
omitted).)
The trial judge also provided the jury with a ver-
dict sheet containing four “questions”:
1. Verdict on count one.
2. Amount of heroin and cocaine involved in the 
conspiracy, if  any.
3. Verdict on count two.
4. “Was the [unlawful computer use] conspiracy 
in furtherance of the crime charged in Count 
One, namely, the conspiracy to import a con-
trolled substance?” (Id. at 340.)
Jury Questions
During the first day of deliberations, the jury sent 
the judge a note that asked, “Count 2: must the ver-
dict in #4 be in agreement with Count #1?” (Id.) The 
jury was asking whether the findings it would use to 
answer question 4 had to be consistent with its verdict 
on count one. The trial judge consulted with counsel. 
The prosecution urged a “no” answer, arguing that 
Moran-Toala could have intended to have exceeded 
her computer authority in furtherance of the narcot-
ics conspiracy without having enough knowledge to 
be a member of the conspiracy. Defense counsel urged 
a “yes” answer to foreclose the possibility of incon-
sistent verdicts. The trial judge’s initial reaction was 
that the defense was correct, but ultimately he told 
the jury that its verdict on count one and the felony 
enhancement did not have to be “in agreement.” The 
jury returned its verdict about 20 minutes after getting 
the judge’s response to its note. It acquitted Moran-
Toala of the narcotics conspiracy, but convicted her 
of conspiring to unlawfully access a computer in fur-
therance of the same narcotics conspiracy.
Post-Trial Motion
Moran-Toala filed a post-trial motion pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to set aside 
the jury’s enhancement finding. The trial judge con-
cluded that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent.
While there may be scenarios in which an indi-
vidual can act in furtherance of a conspiracy 
without joining the conspiracy, there is no view 
of the evidence in this particular case that would 
permit that conclusion. The government’s the-
ory at trial was that Moran-Toala would, at a 
co-conspirator’s request, periodically access 
confidential information regarding narcotics sei-
zures and other information and pass it on to the 
coconspirator. . . . By finding that Moran-Toala 
committed the conspiracy computer offense 
“in furtherance of the crime charged in Count 
one,” the jury necessarily determined that she 
had agreed with another—her co-conspirator 
on the computer charge—to commit the crime; 
that she had intentionally advanced the narcotics 
conspiracy; and that she had committed an overt 
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Put sim-
ply, Moran-Toala could not have intentionally 
misused her computer to advance a narcotics 
conspiracy without being a member of that 
conspiracy. Thus, when the jury asked whether 
the special verdict on the [felony] enhancement 
needed to be “in agreement” with its verdict on 
count one, it was effectively asking whether the 
verdict had to be consistent.
(Moran-Toala, 726 F.3d at 340–41.)
But the judge also concluded that even if  the 
court’s error produced the inconsistency, Moran-
Toala was not entitled to relief.
The Appeal
The court of  appeals first noted that because the 
jury acquitted the defendant on count one, the 
double jeopardy clause barred any retrial of  the 
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defendant on that count, regardless of the correct-
ness of  the verdict or whether it was a consistent 
verdict. The court cited not only Dunn but also its 
decision in United States v. Acosta, 17 F.3d 538 (2d 
Cir. 1994), for the proposition that inconsistent 
verdicts are unreviewable on appeal. But the court 
noted that Moran-Toala was challenging the judge’s 
“no” instruction to the jury in response to its ques-
tion rather than simply focusing on inconsistency.
The court observed that the judge initially and 
correctly explained to the jury that its verdict on the 
narcotics conspiracy should be “linked” to its findings 
on the felony enhancement because the felony enhance-
ment only applied if Moran-Toala unlawfully used her 
CBP computer with the intent to further the conspir-
acy. The court opined that the jury clearly recognized 
the tension between acquittal on count one and an 
affirmative answer to question 4 and that the trial judge 
essentially blessed the jury’s desire to be inconsistent.
The court concluded that, had the judge answered 
“yes” to the jury’s question and had the jury none-
theless returned an inconsistent verdict, the jury’s act 
would have been one of nullification; but the judge’s 
“no” answer to the jury effectively invited the jury 
to nullify the law and misled the jury as to its duty.
Nature of the Error
The court ultimately concluded that the judge’s erro-
neous “no” answer to the jury did not amount to 
“structural error,” which always requires reversal. 
Citing Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008), the 
court reasoned that a harmless error analysis applies 
to instructional errors unless an error categorically 
vitiates all the jury’s findings, and concluded that 
the erroneous “no” should be subject to harmless 
error review. The court explained the difficulty in 
assessing the effect of the error:
Harmless error review in this case is compli-
cated by the factual, if  not legal, inconsistency 
in the jury’s verdicts. The very reason such ver-
dicts are unreviewable in and of themselves is 
because we could do no more than “try to guess 
which of the inconsistent verdicts is the one the 
jury really meant.” We might speculate as to 
what the jury actually had in mind in order to 
seek to reconcile the two verdicts: perhaps the 
jury found that Moran-Toala had insufficient 
knowledge of the narcotics conspiracy to sup-
port a conviction on Count One, in which case 
a properly instructed jury likely would have also 
rejected the felony enhancement. Or the jury 
might have found that Moran-Toala’s intent to 
further the narcotics conspiracy by misusing 
her CBP computer also proved her membership 
in the narcotics conspiracy, but it did not wish 
to convict on such a serious charge without 
evidence that she personally imported or sold 
drugs; in that case, a properly instructed jury 
likely would have applied the felony enhance-
ment. The problem with either speculation, 
though, beyond the fact that they are specula-
tions, is that they do not account for the jury’s 
query: “Count 2: must the verdict in #4 be in 
agreement with Count #1?” This note strongly 
suggests that the jury itself could not reconcile 
the verdicts on the two counts and was seeking 
(and obtained) permission to render its con-
templated verdicts despite the inconsistency.
There is thus no serious doubt that the 
erroneous instruction contributed to any 
inconsistency in the verdicts inasmuch as it 
explicitly permitted them. We are not unaware 
of the fact that the district court’s instruction 
ultimately resulted in a highly favorable ver-
dict for Moran-Toala, who was convicted of 
the less serious charge and acquitted of  the 
more serious one. But, in light of the dearth 
of evidence of Moran-Toala’s knowledge of 
the Espinal-Polanco airport conspiracy, it is 
nevertheless possible that a jury would have 
acquitted her of the narcotics conspiracy and 
declined to apply the felony enhancement had 
the supplemental instruction been correct and 
informed the jury that inconsistent verdicts 
are impermissible. We therefore cannot say 
with any confidence that it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a properly instructed 
jury would have convicted Moran-Toala of 
felony-level unlawful computer access conspir-
acy. Accordingly, the conviction on Count Two 
must be vacated and the case remanded to the 
district court for retrial, should the govern-
ment be inclined to pursue the charge.
(Moran-Toala, 726 F.3d at 344–45 (footnote omit-
ted) (citation omitted).)
The Lesson
The lesson of  the case is clear. Whether courts 
and judges like it or not, juries have the ability to 
engage in a type of  jury nullification by returning 
inconsistent verdicts. The law is well established 
that courts will not review such verdicts and set 
aside convictions because a jury compromised. But 
courts will not knowingly encourage nullification, 
and if  they do the encouragement is reviewable and 
may, as in Moran-Toala, result in the setting aside 
of  a conviction when it is too difficult to ascertain 
what the jury would have done absent the improper 
judicial encouragement. n
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